> [CogSec (Cognitive Security) Collaborative](https://archive.is/78Fze)
### 1. Tools and Techniques for Cognitive Security

Tools and Techniques for Cognitive Security
> by SJ Terp & Roger Johnstone
> CanSecWest, March 18th 2020
***
### 2. Who are These people?

> SJ Terp, Pablo Breuer, Grant Dobbe, grugq, Roger Johnston, CogSec Collab Community
***
### 3. CogSec Collab: Roots

> Credibility Coalition - m!s!nfosec
> * Industry
> * Academia
> * Media
> * Community
> * Infosec
***
### 4. CogSec Collab: 2020 Mission

- bring together information security researchers, data scientists and other subject-matter experts.
- to create and improve resources
- for the defense of the cognitive domain
***
### 5. CogSec Collab: 2020 Milestones

* Milestone 1: April 2020
* AM!TT Counters; Who, What, How
* AM!TT Playbook PoC
* Milestone 2: July 2020
* AM!TT Playbook; Public, Social Media, ISPs, Government
* Tooling; Threat Intelligence
* Milestone 3: October 2020
* AM!TT Playbook; refine
* Tooling
* Data Sets
***
### 6. COGSEC COLLAB: END USERS

*Who uses this stuff anyway?*
***
### 7. RESPONSE ACTORS

* Platform
* Government
* Elves
* Public
* Influencer
* Media
* Nonprofit
* Educator
* Corporation
***
### 8. Elf Communities and Playbooks

***
### 9. INFORMATION SHARING NETWORKS

***
### 10. DISINFORMATION LANDSCAPE

> ##### *The Only defense against the world is a thorough knowledge of it.*
> -- John Locke
***
### 11. DISINFORMATION

> deliberate promotion... of false, misleading or mis-attributed information
>
> focus on creation, propagation, consumption of misinformation online
>
> We are especially interested in misinformation designed to change beliefs in a large number of people
***
### 12. DISINFORMATION 'LAYERS'

***
### 13. NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE

Resources available in pursuit of national objectives...
> Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
...and how to influence other nation-states.
***
### 14. BUSINESS INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE

Resources available in pursuit of corporate objectives...
> Business Deals & Strategic Partnerships, PR and Advertising, Mergers and Acquisitions, R&D and Capital Investments
***
### 15. DESCRIBING DISINFORMATION

> AM!TT and other models of WTF is happening
***
### 16. AM!TT FRAMEWORK

**A**dversarial **M**isinformation and **I**nfluence **T**actics and **T**echniques = (AM!TT)
* Credibility Coalition Misinfosec Working Group
* AM!TT is a framework for understanding organized communication attacks
***
### 17. AM!TT FRAMEWORK

***
### 18. AM!TT - T0010

***
### 19. AM!TT - T0010

*IRA IN GHANA: DOUBLE DECEIT*
Cultivate Ignorant Agents
* "EBLA" NGO local staff
* Attempt to co-opt US influencers
***
### 20. DISINFORMATION COUNTERMEASURES

Moving from admiring the problem to action
***
### 21. MITIGATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURES

> Countermeasures are that form of military science that, by the employment of devices and/or techniques, is designed to **impair the operational effectives of enemy activity.** Countermeasures can be **active or passive** and can be deployed **preemptively or reactively.**
>
> -- JP 3-13.1, Information Operations - Joint Chiefs of Staff
***
### 22. FINDING COUNTERMEASURES
https://i.ibb.co/XJQXCkL/Slide22.png
* Existing
* Tactic-based
* Technique-based
* Doctrine-based
***
### 23. EXISTING COUNTERS

***
### 24. TACTIC-BASED: COURSES OF ACTION MATRIX

| AM!TT Phase | Detect | Deny | Disrupt | Degrade | Deceive | Destroy | Deter |
| --------------------- | ------ | ---- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ----- |
| Strategic Planning | | | | | | | |
| Objective Planning | | | | | | | |
| Develop People | | | | | | | |
| Develop Networks | | | | | | | |
| Microtargeting | | | | | | | |
| Develop Content | | | | | | | |
| Channel Selection | | | | | | | |
| Pump Priming | | | | | | | |
| Exposure | | | | | | | |
| Go Physical | | | | | | | |
| Persistence | | | | | | | |
| Measure Effectiveness | | | | | | | |
***
### 25. EFFECTS

- Detect: find them
- Deny: stop them getting in
- Disrupt: interrupt them
- Degrade: slow them down
- Deceive: divert them
- Destroy: damage them
- Deter: discourage them
***
### 26. ORGANISING COUNTERMEASURES

***
### 27. DOCTRINE-BASED COUNTERMEASURES

> ###### *"A disinformation campaign is made up of resources and infrastructure and operates over time, with them as a universal scarcity."*
> -- Grugq
***
### 28. CRITICAL ELEMENTS

- Resources
- Infrastructure
- Execution
- Time
***
### 29. DOCTRINE-BASED COUNTERMEASURES

| Critical Element | Detect | Deny | Disrupt | Degrade | Deceive | Destroy | Deter | |
| ---------------- | ------ | ---- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ----- | ---- |
| Resources | | | | | | | | |
| Infrastructure | | | | | | | | |
| Execution | | | | | | | | |
| Time | | | | | | | | |
* resource exhaustion
* cost-effectiveness
* time constraints
***
### 30. DOCTRINE-BASED COUNTERMEASURES
https://i.ibb.co/nBwRr1j/Slide30.png
*IRA IN GHANA: DOUBLE DECEIT*
* Resources
- Staff ~16
- Audience ~338k
- Mobile D

evices
* Infrastructure
- NGO
- Operator Content Pool
- Twitter Analytics
* Execution
- T0007, T0010, T0015, T0055, T0013
- T0014, T0018, T0021, T0030, T0039
- T0042, T0053
* Time
- Direct Engagement
- No Automation + Bots
- 'Audience Building' Phase
***
### 31. PLAYBOOKS

***
### 32. RP_0003_fake_engagement

***
### 33. THREAT INTELLIGENCE TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

things we borrowed from infosec
***
### 34. OASIS STIX™ 2

* AM!TT needed a standard for data exchange
- Relationships + Rich language
- Extensible
- Intelligence Sharing (ISACs & ISAOs)
- Integration with community tooling
* AM!TT is now available as a STIX 2.0 bundle
- https://github.com/cog-collaborative/amitt_cti
***
### 35. STIX AMITT

| Misinformation STIX | Description | Level | Infosec STIX |
| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------- | ----------------- |
| Report | communication to other responders | Communication | Report |
| Campaign | Longer attacks (Russia's interference in the 2016 US elections is a "campaign") | Strategy | Campaign |
| **Incident** | **Shorter-duration attacks, often part of a campaign** | **Strategy** | **Intrusion Set** |
| Course of Action | Response | Strategy | Course of Action |
| Identity | Actor (individual, group, organisation etc): creator, responder, target, useful idiot etc. | Strategy | Identity |
| Threat actor | Incident creator | Strategy | Threat Actor |
| Attack pattern | Technique used in incident (see framework for examples) | TTP | Attack patter |
| **Narrative** | **Malicious narrative (story, meme)** | **TTP** | **Malware** |
| Tool | bot software, APIs, marketing tools | TTP | Tool |
| Observed Data | artefacts like messages, user accounts, etc | Artefact | Observed Data |
| Indicator | posting rates, follow rates, etc | Artefact | Indicator |
| Vulnerability | Cognitive biases, community structural weakness etc | Vulnerability | Vulnerability |
https://github.com/cogsec-collaborative/amitt_cti
***
### 36. AM!TT + MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator

- Navigation of STIX formatted data
- Visualization
- Red + Blue team planning
- Exportable layers
https://www.cogsec-collab.org/project/amitt_navigator/
***
### 37. IRA IN GHANA: DOUBLE DECEIT

***
### 38. MISP - Open Source Threat Intelligence Platform

* Store and share structured data
* Enrichment + Automation
* Open + Extensible
* ISAO + ISAC + Elves
https://www.misp-project.org/
***
### 39. AM!TT + MISP

* MISP Misinformation Galaxy containing AM!TT Framework definitions
***
### 40. AM!TT + MISP

***
### 41. AM!TT + MISP

* AM!TT Techniques Galaxy
* DFRLab Dichotomies of Disinformation Taxonomy
* MISP Objects
- forged-document
- blog, meme-image
***
### 42. AM!TT + MISP

* MISP Event Graph
* blog
* microblog
* forged-document
* person
* user-account
***
### 43. OpenCTI - OPEN THREAT INTELLIGENCE PLATFORM

* STIX 2.0
* Knowledge Graph
* Report based
* MISP integration
https://www.opencti.io
***
### 44. AM!TT + OpenCTI
https://i.ibb.co/d0X3X5b/Slide44.png
***
### 45. NEXT: AM!TT + Atomic Threat Coverage
https://i.ibb.co/MSBRffF/Slide45.png
* Done: AM!TT Techniques
* Next: AM!TT Counters
* Playbooks are assembled from sets of counters
* Markdown, Confluence, API, ...
https://github.com/atc-project/atomic-threat-coverage
***
### 46. COMMUNITY TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
https://i.ibb.co/cXMLG75/Slide46.png
things we borrowed from data science
***
### 47. CogSec Collaborative - AM!TT m!s!nfosec
https://i.ibb.co/crv82F7/Slide47.png
#### Join the Elves
##### *CogSec Collaborative helps communities counter disinformation.*
***
### 48. THANK YOU
https://i.ibb.co/vV1xB7N/Slide48.png
CogSec Collab
https://www.cogsec-collab.org
@bodaceacat
@VV_X_7