![image.png](https://files.peakd.com/file/peakd-hive/arbitration/EoptoniNPPCUEVgLKcotBczyVPEfcfqTSTwFgKQko97fMqzjZx7xRVkSJXUrZyqD79k.png)

*Luke Hallam* has an interesting piece:

https://www.persuasion.community/p/beyond-the-first-amendment

He notes, from Tocqueville, that Americans:

> "saw people afraid to speak up for their true beliefs in front of their neighbors. He saw the chilling effect of conformity as citizens toed the line on matters of politics and religion. To a foreigner like Tocqueville, Americans “will disclose truths…but when they go down into the marketplace they use quite different language.”"

And that:

> "that morality in a democratic republic doesn’t come from edicts handed down by a religious or political hierarchy, as in an authoritarian state. Instead morality comes from within, from the people. Public mores are subject to the capricious and cruel whims of the crowd, and this impacts politics, culture—just about everything."

The relation of conversation to markets is interesting. Adam Smith might be understood to describe a baseline shared morality achievable through the open exchange of sympathies.

When engaged in discussion that relates to governance, to do so democratically means to participate in an exchange process that naturally comes to consensus by rejecting extreme views. That does not mean extreme views are not given voice! However, most don't obtain at the general level.

So, of course we use different language in the marketplace than in other settings. However, governance conversations might be more robust if the language were more like marketplace language!

Now, public morality comes from within, and might form through a process analogous to markets, but Hallam thinks this is a bad thing, and I can understand why to some extent. He says it makes governance subject to "the capricious and cruel whims of the crowd." Factional fighting can become vicious. However, I think Hallam is taking his perception of markets as avaricious and applying it to the realm of governance deliberation. 

Neither need be avaricious. Economists often model markets as exchanges among reclusive (purely selfish) agents. But most people are not hermits. We desire the company of others, and we want to be liked. We desire approbation (in Adam Smith's terms). In that case, most market exchanges are also exchanges of sympathy. The exception would be something like shopping at Walmart and using the self check-out lane. But chances are, even then you will exchange a smile with someone in the store, including those who work there.

The surpluses from market exchanges are analogous to the joy generated in social interactions that include exchanges of approbation. Social surpluses can't be measured but neither can market surpluses (despite the triangles shown in supply and demand graphs).

If consensus obtains, extreme opinions are pushed aside. Hallam describes this as coercive. If the opinions are not permitted a platform for expression, then I can understand the accusation of coercion, but otherwise I disagree. 

And I think that is what Hallam is after. I agree with and understand what he is trying to get at. But I think he needs to be careful about the foundations he lays for his argument.