In order to address that problem, we discussed ways to incentivize crunching smaller projects if they fall below a certain threshold; that solution is discussed in the third point of the "Impact of the Changes" section. 

However, I'd like to point out a few things:
1. The Gridcoin network only supplies around 46% of TNGrid's RAC - see @parejan's [post from today](https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@parejan/3lhjcu-gridcoin-weekly-project-update-wk39), first table, "Team RAC vs Overall RAC %". So even if all of the Gridcoin crunchers left, TNGrid would still have more than half of their computing power.
2. It's not certain that people will just leave smaller projects if there is no artificial incentive to crunch them, so it's quite likely that TNGrid would still keep a good number of Gridcoin crunchers.
3. [The project was launched before Gridcoin was even created](https://boinc.berkeley.edu/wiki/TN-Grid), so they must have had funding and resources before Gridcoin came along. For this reason, I don't think that the project would be "dead" if we dropped the artificial incentive to crunch it.

Personally, I advocate for total normalization without artificial incentives - I think that there are other ways to incentivize people to crunch smaller projects than the incentives that we currently have in place.

However, I understand that others in our community do not agree, and that's what the compromise was intended to address - there is still a way to economically incentivize crunching smaller projects whilst also dropping our current reward mechanism in favor of the one that I'm proposing. For that reason, I don't think that this issue affects the viability or desirability of adopting this proposal, since it also has many other benefits.

Good comment @javierf and maybe this can be taken into consideration setting up the reward system.