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# Exploring the Frontiers of Consciousness and Cognition

## The Debate Over the Existence of the Self

The discussion begins with Thomas Metzinger, who has long argued that the self does not exist. He sees consciousness as a complex phenomenon with many problems, from the question of global integration to the issue of phenomenal atoms - the smallest units of experience. Metzinger believes the most difficult aspect is the subjectivity of consciousness, which is often tied to a first-person perspective.

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Metzinger has proposed the concept of "epistemic agent models" - systems that model themselves as a knowing self. However, he has done this under the assumption that such selves do not actually exist in the world. He sees two camps on this issue - those who believe selves do exist, and Michael Levin, who even capitalizes the word "Self" in his writings.

## Michael Levin's Perspective on the Self

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Levin explains that his primary focus is not consciousness research, but rather more practical, conventional accounts of cognition. He acknowledges that he does not have a new theory of consciousness to push. Levin believes that cognition and consciousness are properties of living things, but may have existed before life itself. He is wary of being overly reductive, arguing that parsimony should not come at the expense of enabling future discovery.

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Levin defines the "Self" as a coherent, emergent whole with an option space, a cognitive light cone, and cognitive processes that allow it to navigate that space with competency. He sees the Self as a decision-making system that lives forward in time, interpreting its memories in the present. Levin argues that this conception of the Self may not align with how others use the term, but it is a useful construct for understanding certain systems.

## The Debate Over Goals, Intentionality, and Representation

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Metzinger is skeptical of Levin's use of terms like "goal" and "agency," arguing that these concepts import human phenomenology and may not accurately capture the underlying dynamics of non-human systems. He suggests a more sober, control-theoretic notion of goal-directedness, while acknowledging the value of using intentional vocabulary as an instrument for interaction, rather than as a realist claim about the nature of reality.

Levin agrees that he is not advocating for true, intrinsic goals, but rather a functional, observer-dependent framework that allows for richer interaction with systems. He argues that different levels of description may be appropriate for different purposes, and that a scale-free, multi-scale approach to cognition can be valuable.

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## The Ethical Challenges of Synthetic Phenomenology

The discussion turns to the ethical challenges posed by the potential creation of artificial or synthetic forms of consciousness and suffering. Metzinger expresses deep concerns about the risks of inadvertently creating suffering through research into these areas, and the need for a rigorous, empirically-grounded theory of suffering to guide such work.

Levin acknowledges the gravity of these issues, but argues that the path to alleviating human and animal suffering may inevitably require grappling with the nature of consciousness and cognition, even if that carries risks. He emphasizes the need for humility, caution, and the development of ethical frameworks to navigate these complex waters.

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The conversation explores the possibility of creating "suffering-free" forms of synthetic phenomenology, as well as the philosophical and practical challenges involved. Ultimately, both Metzinger and Levin agree that this is an area requiring deep ethical reflection and a commitment to minimizing harm, even as the frontiers of knowledge are pushed forward.