A copy of me will of course not be the same thread of consciousness as the one instantiated in my own brain-meat, but it doesn't seem impossible that "I" could exist in parallel. In which case both are fully "me", and when the copy persists past "my" death, it can still truly be said that I am alive (and possibly immortal, depending on how you define that).

I'm not actually sure that that existence-in-parallel is what happens, but then the whole issue around that is an open question of philosophy - the questions in this area are called the problems of [identity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity).

Depending on exactly how the questions of personal identity resolve, it might be the case that even going to sleep is fatal (if "you" are a continuous consciousness, then after that 8 hours a night you spend unconscious, isn't the person who wakes up merely a copy, with your memories?) or it might be the case that uploading isn't even necessary to live forever (in a big enough multiverse, there's always a you somewhere, why should the death of this instance of "you" inconvenience you at all?), but somewhere in the middle ground there's a chance to live forever as a digital mind.