> This means that whales need to spread their votes across 1000 times as much content as normal users or refrain from voting all together.

Unfortunately, I think this suggestion will [enable the vulnerability that allows pacts to form that can game the voting system](https://steemit.com/steem/@anonymint/blog-rewards-can-t-be-widely-distributed).

Afaics, the design is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Damned if you do, and Dan'med if you don't. (Lol just humor, no offense)

> The finite limits of whale attention limits the scalability of reward distribution.

And the finite cognitive bandwidth limit, [as the diversity of communities outstrips a whales' engagement and understanding](https://steemit.com/steem/@anonymint/blog-rewards-can-t-be-widely-distributed#@anonymint/re-anonymint-re-nanzo-scoop-re-anonymint-re-nanzo-scoop-re-anonymint-blog-rewards-can-t-be-widely-distributed-20160811t042858237z).

> Some savvy whales, such as @smooth, are actively hiring people to process content and vote on their behalf.

I think that is a mistake, not only for the reason I stated above, but also because it [places a slow-moving, rigid top-down mgmt structure on the spontaneous formation of new communities within the ecosystem](https://steemit.com/steem/@anonymint/blog-rewards-can-t-be-widely-distributed#@anonymint/re-anonymint-re-nanzo-scoop-re-anonymint-re-nanzo-scoop-re-anonymint-blog-rewards-can-t-be-widely-distributed-20160811t042858237z). I've been having many discussions with @smooth and unfortunately I have observed that @smooth was the moderator (censor!) for the Monero Speculation thread on BCT and he seems to relish a role as a top-down censor. I hate censorship (meaning any top-down influence on content). I believe in self-forming coteries and the highest degrees-of-freedom.

> The root of all authority must be derived from stakeholder Steem Power or Sybil attacks will quickly undermine the algorithm.

But can't stake be Sybil attacked by free signup "air drop" accounts?

> you let each account link to other accounts that they trust to allocate funds and curate content then the result is a massively recursive delegated voting system. Allowing links to have positive and negative weights means that everyone has the power to contribute to filtering the “good” people from the “bad” people.

Yes a Web of Trust (WoT) is a self-forming coterie and is normally a solution, but the problem is you are taking the funding from the globalized debasement, thus the WoT can be gamed because that globalized resource will always be a winner-take-all power vacuum vulnerability. It appears to be fundamental, but I am open to hearing about novel solutions.

> So long as there are many more “good” people than “bad” people, the bad actors are quickly neutralized by having more negative links than positive links.

Problem again is the air drops can be Sybil attacked. And even real people can enjoin pacts to achieve the winner-take-all because those who don't will be at a disadvantage. In a very abstract way it is analogous to selfish-mining.

> Once we have limited the number of links it is simply a matter of spreading the calculation over time and prioritizing calculations that will effect the biggest changes. So long as the rate at which links can change is slower than the rate at which the algorithm can reach equilibrium then on average the network will remain close enough to equilibrium to accomplish the desired goal.

Perhaps use the Follows list. I am not disputing the power of a WoT, but that localization of discernment power is game theoretically subverted (destroyed) once you use it to award a redistibution from the collective. Essentially you are conflating popularity and local preferences.